Cooperation Theory in International Relations
In theory, knowing the elements of cooperation theory ought to be applicable to real-world dilemmas -- conflict and cooperation between nations, ending civil wars, for example. Here are two summaries: a broad view of the mechanics of international conflict and cooperation through the lens of game theory; and an application of game theory to very real-world situations such as the civil war in El Salvador ("Wood identifies a way to craft a peace settlement so that it is optimally robust, by examining where the belief thresholds for all parties intersect along potential distributions.")
Source: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Chapter Four)
Pub: Princeton University Press: 1984
URL: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691122489/after-hegemony
Author: Keohane, Robert
Findings:
A 'harmony of interests' exists when two parties can both get where they want by pursuing their own goals without communicating. Their pursuit of their own interests automatically achieves the Other's interests as well. Where harmony exists, cooperation is unnecessary. Coordination can happen, but it isn't cooperation, it’s just communicating and coordinating already harmonious endeavors.
Cooperation isn't necessary unless there is a conflict in the pursuit of interests. Cooperation requires behavioral adjustment to other’s interests.
Discord is possible in two ways: 1) refusal to adjust, or 2) failure to adjust. In contrast to outright refusal to adjust, failure to adjust means an attempt was made but the process of cooperation failed to overcome collective action problems.
Getting to cooperation may involve redefining what is in a given actor's "self-interest."
One Sentence:
Using “international [cooperation] regimes” as an example, Keohane examines how cooperation is possible in the absence of a “hegemon” to enforce compliance.
One Paragraph:
Using “international [cooperation] regimes” as an example, Keohane examines how cooperation is possible in the absence of a “hegemon” to enforce compliance. Cooperation regimes set expectations and reinforce norms, they shape actors’ behavior in the long-term, and thus promote sustained cooperation.
One Page:
Using “international [cooperation] regimes” as an example, Keohane examines how cooperation is possible in the absence of a “hegemon” to enforce compliance.
Keohane distinguishes cooperation from harmony and discord as follows:
Harmony refers to a situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate attainment of the other’s goals. An example is the classical economic market, in which Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” regulates supply and demand.
Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through mutual adjustment.
Discord, the opposite of harmony, stimulates the need for cooperation
Cooperation takes places only in situations where actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict, not where there is harmony. Without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate.
Any act of cooperation or apparent cooperation needs to be interpreted within the context of related actions, and of prevailing expectations and shared beliefs, before its meaning can be properly understood.
Quoting John Ruggie, Keohane defines regimes as a “set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.” Both formal rules and informal norms (standards of behavior) are used to sustain international cooperation. A major function of regimes is to facilitate the making of specific cooperative agreements among states.
Because regimes set expectations and reinforce norms, they shape actors’ behavior in the long-term, and thus promote sustained cooperation.
Title: Modeling Robust Settlements to Civil War: Indivisible Stakes and Distributional Compromises
Pub: Santa Fe Institute: Working Papers, October 2003
URL: http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/wpabstract/200310056
Author: Wood, Elisabeth Jean
Findings:
Sanctioning trade of illicit commodities is recommended to reverse its negative effects on brokering a settlement.
Outcome uncertainty, as is common in the tumult of a civil war, results in less robust settlements, but can be counteracted with diplomatic efforts to increase confidence in the mutual-compliance settlement. Positive personal interactions between top leaders of conflicting parties and confidence inspired by mediators will facilitate finding the optimal distributional terms. Power sharing arrangements, such as decentralization of power into sub-national units and guaranteed numbers of positions for minority groups, can lessen the impact of uncertainty resulting from post-war elections.
Parties can limit the variation of post-war outcomes by arranging market institutions to counteract variation that might come about in post-war policy-making. For instance, a conflict between one side that represents the interests of labor and one of capital could be buffered with a constitutional focus on the rights to private property and to strike. In South Africa and El Salvador, promotion of economic interdependence between parties was encouraged by elites to safeguard their freedom of choice for investment.
Although the hope is that a self-enforcing cooperative strategy of withdrawal is sustainable without external enforcement, third party actors can assist by forming and monitoring institutions that promote revenue sharing. The implementation of such a plan is often difficult and can be complicated by the limiting factors of war-time benefits. As of the writing of the article the role of international actors in monitoring the distribution of revenue was being discussed in Sudanese peace negotiations.
One Sentence:
From mathematical modeling of the risk factors and uncertainty involved in a party’s continued conflict, withdrawal from conflict or commitment to a peace agreement, the distributional aspects surrounding civil war negotiations are shown to determine the robustness and range of potential settlements; the actual moves of conflicting parties in civil wars are found to reflect the dynamics of game theoretical models.
One Paragraph:
In the absence of a decisive military advantage, self-enforcing peace settlements are still possible in a civil war. Wood explores the conditions under which parties will not necessarily renege in the absence of external enforcement, regarding settlements which distribute post-war political power and economic resources. Self-enforcing settlements rely on each party surpassing a “critical belief threshold” wherein the best response becomes to compromise for peace given the other party’s likelihood to compromise. In other words, the critical belief threshold is surpassed by altering the structure of payoffs so as to change the conflict from a Prisoner’s Dilemma to an Assurance Game.
Continuing to fight can be a self-enforcing strategy, as is seen in real conflicts when war-time benefits like illicit trade are not reproducible in times of peace. The range of potential settlements is the set of distributional arrangements in which the critical belief threshold is surpassed for both parties. The robustness of a settlement refers to its ability to withstand the exogenous shocks that often occur and influence the confidence of parties in the peace process.
Wood identifies a way to craft a peace settlement so that it is optimally robust, by examining where the belief thresholds for all parties intersect along potential distributions. She introduces as a variable in the conflict the perceived degree of indivisibility of stakes, as stakes in real conflicts are often not totally divisible or indivisible and the actor’s perceptions play a large role. Perceptions of indivisibility of goods reduce the range and robustness of potential settlements. Examples of partially indivisible stakes include holy sites, strategic locations and network systems, wherein control is not worth very much until the party controls a lot of it. Factions often arise within a party when there are differing opinions on the payoff of a settlement and similarly lead in the theoretical model to decreases in the range and robustness of settlements.